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TERRITORIALITY AND M ORAL D ISSENSUS: THOUGHTS
ON ABORTION, SLA'~lERY, GAY fv1~l{_,'UAGE At"'D FAMfLY
VALUES

By Seth F. Kreimer*

I. 1'-JTRODUCTION
A house divided can sometimes clai m virtues and I am on record
praising those claims. Five years ago, as a supporter of women's right
to choose abortion, I contemplated Ll-Je possible demise of Roe v.
Wade. 1 At the time, it appeared that an emerging conservative majority
on the Su preme Court would free state legislatures of constitutional
restraint, leaving a state by state patchwork of abortion legislation
reminiscent of the years immediately before Roe. I explored the degree
to which restrictive states would be able to interfere with efforts of
women to take advantage of the regime of their more liberal nei ghbors.2
In that context, territorial limitation of state legislative jurisdiction
was a boon to liberty . I argued that there were reasons both of precedent and policy favoring a system in which states would be free to
adopt moral norms binding within their borders, but not free to export
them. 3 Territoriality had the virtue of consistency with the American

• Copyrigh t June 1997; Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Thi s essay has
benefitted .;nonnous!y from the comments and assistance of my colleagues Sally Gordon, Howard
Lesrj ck, and Barbara Woodhouse . Tney deserve my public thanks for their generosity of time and
insight, but bear no responsibility for any mi stakes or missteps contained in the following pages.
I. 4 JO US.I 13(1973).
2. See Seth F. Kreimer, "Bw Whoever Treasures Freedom ... ": The Right to Travel and
Extralerritorial Abortions, 9 1 M ICH. L. REv. 907 (1 993); Seth F. Kreimer, Th e Law of Choice and
Choice of Law: Abortion , the Right to Tra vel and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992).
3. ln the context of abortion , the most relevant precedent was Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 ( 1975), where Lhe Court overturned the conviction of a Virginia newspaper for runn ing
an ad regarding the availability of New York abortion. The Court commented:
The Virginia Legislature could not have regulated the advertiser's activity in New
York , and obviously could not have proscribed the activity in that State . ... NeiL'ler
could Virg inia prevent its residents from traveling to New York to obtain those ser ;ic161
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traditions of moral pluralism combined wit:'l free interstate travel an.d
national citizenship. It had the advantage of corresponding to
commonsense perceptions of law linked to a straightforward explanation of iegal authority. And, most important to advocates of reproductive freedom, it gave women some measure of choice as to the Jaw
w hich govemed them; escape from an oppressive iegal context was
available to kilowledgeable women who could raise the price of a
round trip bus ticket. 4
If the right to punish rnoral dev iations were limited to a s tate ' s
own terTi tory, women wou ld not enter neighboring states carrying the
abortion legis1ation of their home state with them Eke a ball and chain .
As long as at least a few states retained abortion rights , those rights
would be potentially available to women elsewhere in the country.
As it rums out, my territorial enthusiasm, while shared by the
Supreme Court in at least one recent case, 5 has been of secondary
importance in the area of abortion rights. Roe was in fact reaffirmed in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and for most women, the "due burdens"
which Casey sanctions have not been so onerous that in most cases
"migratory abortion" has been a necessary option. 6 In the areas where

es, or. as the State conceded prosecute them for going there . Virginia possessed no
authority to regulate the services provided in New York ....
!d. at 822-24 (citations omitted).
4. The escape route was far from perfect. for it depended on access to both information
about extraterritorial opportunities and the capacity to take advantage of them. This meant that
women who were young. poor or uninformed were often unable to take advantage of the escape
route. See, e.g., James She lton, ET .<\L., Abortion Utilization: Does Travel Distance Matter, 8
FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 260, 262 (1976) {fmding a negative correlation between acDrtion rates and distance from abortion facilities strongest for black teenagers); NA.NNETfE J. DAVlS ,
FROM CRIME TO CHOICE 199 (1985) ("Out of state travel costs prevented most poor minorities
fonn using the new abortion broker arrangements [before Roe]"). ld.
On the informational barriers before Roe. see, e.g., NANNETTE 1 DAVIS. FROM C!UME TO
CHOICE 163-70 (1985) (typically four intermediaries). Survey Jata in Steven Polgar & Ellen Fried,
The Bad Old Days: Clandesrine Abortions Anwng rhe Poor in New York Ciry Before Liberaliza·
lion of the Abortion Law, 8 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 125, 126 (1976), suggests that before Roe, at least arnong the women of child bearing age in surveyed poverty areas, only four
percent knew of a physician who could provide an abortion. Of those who sought to tem1inate
pregnancy only two perce nt used doctors, and 80% attempted to terminate pregnancies themselves.
!d.
5. See BMW of North America v. Gore , 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1597 at n.l6 (1996) (comity, fed eralism and sovereignty prevent a state from seeking to control activities outside of its boundaries
by assessing punitive damages based on such activities) citing Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); but
cf U.S. v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (sustaining prohibition of advertising for legal
out of state lonerJ).
6. But cf A Woman 's Choice -East Side Womens' Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434,
1453-55 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (reponing an increase in out of state abortions after Mississippi impcsed
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state regulations in fact verge on the prohibitive-regul ation of young
women 's abortion rights--extraterritorial abortions have softened the
regime. 7
No interesting issue ever truly dies, and thi s symposium presents
the iss ue of territoriality with the emotional pola..ities reversed for me,
fo r sometimes oppression consists not in bindi ng individuals unwillingly , but in refusing to allow them to bind the mselves. Politically,
re li gio us ly , and morally, I see the avail abiii ty of same-sex m arri age as
an unambiguous good. Politically, same-sex marriage pro vi des a means
of affirming lo·v' ing relati onships, build ing fa mil y stab ili ty in the m idst
of an increasing unstable social context, and acknowl edging u'1e equal
entitlement of gay and lesbian citizens to recogn ition as members of
the A merican polity. Religiously, I happen to be a memb-er of one of
the denominatio ns that celebrates same-sex unions.8 Morall y, the refusal to a llow celebration of such marriages , and a fortiori , the refusal to
recognize marriages celebrated elsewhere strikes me as a gratuitously
cruel act of hostility toward gays and lesbians.
Yet I realize my views are far from universa l, and these commitments exist in practical tension with my sense of the territorially limited moral jurisdiction of states in the American polity. One of the virtues of a territorial federalism is precisely that it allows conflicting
communities of commitment to coexist within a single national polity,
while allowing individuals to move fluidly among them. On issues of
fundamental life choices, America has often been a house d ivided, with
the individual citizens entitled to decide the rooms in which they wish
to live .
The principle of territoriality establishes that Georgia cannot pros-

a 24 hour waitin g peri od which effectively required two trips to aborti on providers).
7. See, e.g. ,Virginia Cartoof & Lorraine Klcnnan , Paremal Coment fo r Abortion: The
Impact of 1he Massachusetts Law, 76 A.J.P.H . 398 (1986) (es timatin g that roughly half of Massachusetts teenagers seeking abortions traveled outside of the state); Tamar Lewin , Parental Consent
to Aborrion: How Enforcement Can Vary, N.Y. TIMES , May 28, 1992. at A I (reporting that Indiana abonion clinics advi se teenagers seeking abortions without parental consent to travel to neighboring Ke ntucky or Illinois); cf Commonwealth v. Hartford , No. 95 -98. (C.P. Sulli van Cty, Pa.
1996) (prosecution of adult who assisted Pennsylvania minor in traveling to New York to obtain
abortion without parental consent).
8. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1222-23 (llth Cir. 1995), vacated and reh'g granted, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir !996) (challenging a discharge of state employee who married her lesbian partner in a .Reconstructioni st Jewish ceremony, observing that Reconstructionist Judaism "regards same sex marriages as acceptable and desirable") (rev' d en bane, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
13069 (11th Cir. 1997); see id. at *60 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (acknowledging position of Recon structionist Jew s); id. at *64-67 (Godbold, J., dissent) (acknowledging position of Reconstructionis! Jews).
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ecute its own gay and lesbian citizens for their sexual activities during
v isits to California. But it also allows Georgia to define as obscene and
prohibit materials-however acceptable in California-which California
residents may seek to distribute w ithin Georgia itself. Indeed, part of
the imp licit power of the plaintiffs' case in Romer v. Evans 9 was that
::he Colorado Constitutional Amendment eviscerated the ability of local
cor:nmunities to set their own moral agenda.
H I v13.s right that even withou t Roe , Pennsylnnia coul d not seek
u.:; export its moralistic prohibitions to New Jersey by punishing Permsylv c~n ia citizens for seeking abo rtions g uaran<eed by the New Jersey
C::>nstitution, why should Hawai i be able to export its celebration of
szcrne-s:.::x ma<riages to Pennsylvania? If pregnant women d id not carry
personal law vvith them li.ke a bail and chain into a new state, why
should gay and lesbian couples be able to bear it li.k:e a souvenir shield
on returning from a more welcomin g jurisdiction?

Ii. CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE RULE OF UNIVERSAL V ALID!TY AND
PuBLIC P OLICY

One a11swer could arise from black letter conflict of laws doctrine.
fhe abortion problem involves one set of conflicts principles, whi le
marriage validity is governed by quite different maxims. It has often
been thought dubious for one state to enforce the penal statutes on
conduct in a11other jurisdiction, and even in the loosest m odern conflicts analysis a state has some claim to impose a basic moral order on
actions within its borders. By contrast, the standard conflict of law
doctr.u!es regarding personal status are quite d ifferent; hornbook law
hol ds that marriages valid in the jurisdiction where they are celebrated
are, in the normal course of events, valid everywhere. 10 In a mobile
society where a vveb of personal entitlements grows from maritai status,
the personal hardships associated with marriages u'1at fade in and out of
existence as the partners pass state boundaries counsel strongly in favor
of universal recognition of locally valid marriages.

·-------------------------------------------------------------9. 11 6 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) .
10. E.g .• Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S . 216, 223, 225 ( 1934) (Brandeis, J.); RESTATEME NT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d) Section 283(2) (!971). For an early and intluenti al case invoking the principle on behalf of a New York couple seeking to avoid a New
York statutory prohibition of remarriage after divorce by marf';ing in New Jersey , see Ponsford v.
Johnson, 19 F. Cas. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 11,266), followed in Van Vocrhi s v. Brintnall, 86
N.Y. 18 (1881). See also State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403 (1897) (same: i;1 the absence of explicit
statutory prohibition of extraterritorial remarriage after divorce, marriage valid at the place of contracting will be recognized).
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Other things being equal, this doctrine could easily tip the balance
in states that have no other binding law on Ll-Je subject. Indeed, in the
parallel situation of. inter-racial marriages before Loving v. Virginia, 11
even some southern courts invoked the doctrine of universal validity to
permit recognition of interracial marriages contracted in other states,
12
but impermissi ble under local law . In a state where hostility to samesex relationships is not already embodied in statute, it might be reasonable to expect this position ;:o carry the day, particularly if locai
statutes incorporate the presumption in favor of marital valid ity. State
courts which already have creat iY·": iy interpreted their domestic rel ations
laws to recognize the reali ty of sa111e-sex relationships in the con tex t of
adoption or v isitation disputes 13 are particu larly likely to read their

11. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
12. Miller v. Lucks , 203 Miss. 824 (! 948) (recognizing extraterritorial interracial marriage of
non-dom iciliaries for estate administration purposes); State v. Ross 76 N.C. 212 (1877) (dismissing bigamy prosecution); Stevenson v. Gray. 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 193 (1856) ; Whittington v.
McGask.ii!, 65 Fla. 162 (i 913) (recognizing interracial marriage between Kansas residents fer
estate ad ministrati on purposes). See a!so Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120 (1875) (recognizing
marriage contracted between Utah residents before moving to California, where interracial marriage was prohibited); Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass 156, 159-60 ( 18 19) (recognizing interracial
marriage contracted by Massac husens reside nts extraterritorially).
In some of these states, however, the courts, while willing to recognize interracial marriages contracted between domiciliaries of other states were unwilling to allow their own domiciliaries
to evade domesti c prohibitions. See, e.g .. State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1876) (refusing to recognize interracial marriage contracted between North Carolina residents in South Carolina); cf In re
Takahashi's Estate, 129 P.2d 217, 220 (Mont. 1942) (construing statutory prohibition on recognition of extraterritorial interracial marriage to apply only to marriage contracted by Montana residents seeking to evade prohibition).
13 . E.g., In re Custody of H.S. H-K, i93 Wis. 2d 649 (1995) (recognizing "parent-like"
relationship for purposes of custody and visitation where same-sex couple had agreed to conceive
a child, engaged in mutual dedication ceremony naming both partners as child's parents, named
child with both par..ners ' names , and raised chi ld together for five years despite refusal to allow
adoption by same-sex couple on statutory grounds in Interest of Angel Lace M., 184 Wis. 2d 492
(!994)); A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581 (1992) (au thorizi ng recognition of visitation agreement between members of di~ solved same -sex relationship who had raised the child j ointly for seven
years); In re M.M.D. & B.H.lvl., 662 A.2d 837 (Ct. App. D.C. 1995) (allowing same sex couple to
adopt despite determination in Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (Ct. App. D.C. 1995)
(refusing to require issuance of a marriage license to same sex couple)); In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d
651 (1 995) (approving second parent adoption by same-sex couple despite refusal to approve
standing to seek visitation to same-sex partner of biological mother in In the Matter of Alison D.
v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 65 I (1991)); Adoption of Tammy. 416 Mass. 205, 206 (1993) (approving joint adoption by same-sex couple who "are each functioning, separately and together as the
custodial and psychological parents" of the child); Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.Y.B., 160 Vt.
368, 376 (1 993) (approving adoption by second parent in same sex couple where both partners
had "acted as a parent .. . from the moment [the children] were born"' despite subsequent refusal
to recognize same-sex co-parent as entitled to standing to seek visitation. Tichena l v. Dexter 1997
Vt. LEXIS 16.); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (acknowledging lesbian
couple who jointl y decided on artificial insemination, and sought to establish joint parental rela-
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domestic conflicts law in light of the presumption of marital validity.
In an optimistic scenario, therefore, we might hope that in the
short run the symbolic exclusion of same-sex marriages from local
celebration would suffice to placate the forces hostile to such relationships, at the same time that ease of interstate travel could allow couples
who seek marriage to achieve it. In the longer run a growing number
of same-sex marriages solemnized extraterritorially could dilute the fear
of the percei ved "unnaturai" nature of those relationships with day to
day contact. This was, arguably, the path of the law with respect to
divorce. For a substan tial period of time in the m id-twen tie th century,
low-visibility availab ility of migratory divorces and other faci1itative
devices coexisted ill eguiiibrium with officially restrictive domestic
divorce laws in a workable ideological compromise. 14 After a generation of experience with the normali zation of divorce, no-fault swept the
country. 15
But optimism in this case may be the triumph of hope over experience. The "migratory divorce" compromise depended on the relative
unobtrusiveness of the practice combined with tacit official receptiveness.16 The issue of same-sex marriages is anyt.~ing but unobtrusive.
Rather than emerging in a series of incremental evasions, it is bursting
on the national scene in the mantle of dramatic state constitutional
activism. Same-sex marriage has not rested quietly in the recesses of
low-level judicial practice, but has been drawn to t.~e center of national
partisan politics. Republicans pronounced the issue of same-sex marriage as a litmus of family values in the 1996 presidential election,

tions as a "non-traditional family'" for purposes of standing to seek partial custody); Adoption of
Two Children by ·H.N.R .• 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (same-sex domestic
partner of child's biologi cal mother may adopt child, despite court's unwillingness to require
extension of health insurdllce benefits to same sex partners in Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters
v. Rutgers State Univ .. 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)).
14. See, e.g., Max Rheinstein, lv1ARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 51-105 (!972)
(arguing that "cooperation of courts has made it possible for the great bulk of divorces to be obtained upon the ground of mutual consent which is frowned upon by the official law of every state
of the union"); !d. at 253-57 (arguing that the "make-believe" is an "indispensable part" of a viable compromise on an issue of " ultimate value").
15. Even on the divorce front, of course, my colleague Barbara Woodhouse has emphasized
that "fault" has not been universally exiled from divorce proceedings, and there is now a growing
enthusiasm for re-injecting it where it has been absent. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex. Lies
and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1994). Still, the
availability of the option of divorce is today far closer to the Nevada of the 1950's than to New
York of that era.
16. RHEINSTEIN, supra note II at 255-57 (arguing that " the process would not have unrolled
in the limelight of publicity").
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Democrats acceded, and an increasing number of states have adopted
statutes that explicitly preclude the recognition of same-sex marri ages.
Analysis of the probable results of Hawaii's ultim ate adoption of samesex marri ages, therefore, must proceed on the assumption that in a
number of states, hostile legislatures will embody a refusal to recognize
same-sex marriages in statute.
Once a strong ideological position is embodied in a positive state
statute, the doctrines of comity are unlikely to carry the day unaided,
foe wherev er it is initially celebrated, marriage is an ongoing personal
relationsh ip in which the state of ultimate domi ci le is ii!<ely to assert a
strong interest. If we want to imagine an equilibrium in which states
are impelled by reasons of comity to accept within their borders ongoing relationships to which they are ideologically opposed, the closest
historical parallels are not comforting.
The historical record of conflicts doctrine dating from the wrenching national dispute over slavery gives one indication that stable extraterritorial recognition of a controversial personal status is unlikely.
Despite the effort to accommodate differences between commitments to
slavery and freedom, American doctrine has been that ultimately each
state has authority over the personal status of those domiciled within its
boundaries. 'Where one jurisdiction is willing to regard the status conferred by another jurisdiction as "odious," recognition has been denied.
In the 19th century, the struggle over slavery was a crucible in
which the clash of moral visions between states forged conflict of laws
doctrine. Early in the century, it was not uncommon for state courts to
defer to the moral commitments of sister states. States accorded extraterTitorial recognition to status decisions at odds with the forum state' s
public poLicy. Freedmen who attained their status by legitimate resideiiCe in free states retained freedom on return to some slave jurisdictions.17 Slaves trave ling with their masters in free states, or even sojouming with the m for brief periods of time were treated by free states

17. E. g., Viole t and William v. Stephens 16 (5 Litt. Sel. Cas. ) 147 ( 1812) (recognizing Pennsy lvania statu te granting freedom to Pennsylvania slave as effective ly altering status of former
slaves returned to Kentucky). See, e.g., Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. M<mh) 467, 476 (1820)
(holding that freedom becomes vested by seven years of Indiana residency is the leading case).
Because freedom is a natural ri ght, "(i]f these rights are once vested in ... any other portion of
the United States, can it be compatible with the spirit of our confederated government to deny
their existence in any other pan?" /d. at 188.
Louisiana had an equally strong line of cases, ended by statute in I 846. See ROBERT CovER, JUSTICE A CCUSED 96 (1975); PAUL FiNKELMAN , AN lMPERFECf UNION 206-! I (1981) . See
generally id. at 188-90 (reviewing the "numerous cases [in which] the courts of L~e slave states
respected the power of free states to liberate slaves"). /d. at 188.
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. s1ave status. 18
as retamtng t helf
But these accommodations were matters of interstate comity
adopted ultimately at the discretion of the forum, and as the willingness
to accede to divergent moral visions decayed, so did comi ty. From the
founding of the republic, it had been clear to all concerned that the
rec ognition of the master-slave relationship could not be imposed
extraterritorially against the policy of the receiving state. The impetus
for the ii1clusion of the Fugitive Slave Clause in Article IV was the
unde rst211ding that in its absence, a free state woul d be entitled to treat
a slave who escaped to its territory as free pursuarlt to locai law . 19
As the controversy over slavery grew more bitter in the years
before the Ci vil War, comity dissolved and the Constitution was held
to impose no limit on the rights of both free a.'1d slave states to pursue
u'teir own rnoral visions within their borders. The Supreme Court announced that because "every State has an undoubted right to determine
the status, or domestic and social condition, of the persons domiciled
within its territory, " slave states bore no obligation to recognize a status of freedom acquired in free states. 20

18 . Thus, Pennsylvmia, New Jersey and New York during the early part of the 19th cenmry
granted stamtory periods of protection to the interest of slave-owners passing through their juris·
dictions. See PAUL FINKELMAN, AN l.MPERFECT UNJON, 46, 76 (198 1). Ohio by jadicial interpreta·
tion recognized the servile stams of slaves passing through its jurisdiction, id. at 89-92; as did
L'1diana, e.g .• Sewell's Slaves 3 AM. JUR. 404, 404-07 (1 830); Illinois, e.g .. W i!lard v. People, 5
Ill. ( 4 Scam .) 461 (1843); and California, e.g., Ex Parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147 ( 1858).
19. T he text of the Clause provides that no slave escaping to a free state shall "in conse ·
quence of an y law or Regulation therein, be discharged from" slavery. At the Virginia ratifyi ng
convention, Mad ison adduced as a point in favor of the proposed cc n stir~tion that :o'1e Fugiti·ve
Slave Cl ause al tered the legal stam s quo. "At present, if any slave elopes to ar> y of those s tar~s
where slaves are free, he becomes emancipated by the ir laws; for the laws of :he ,;; ..:,;:; :.ccc unch~
itable to one another in this res pect. " 3 JOHNATHAN ELIOTI , DEBAT"...S ON THe' P..DOJYTIO N OF THE
FEDERAL CONST. 453 ( 1974). See, Robert Cover J USTICE ACCUSED 88 ( 1975); Paul Finkelman,
AN IMPERFECT UNION 27-28 (198 1); Prigg v. Pennsylvania 41 U. S. 539, 6i2 (1842) (" It is mani ·
fest from this consideration, that if the Co nstitution had not cvntained thi s clause, every non-slaveholding :;mte in the Union wou ld have been at liberty to have declared free all runa way slaves
coming within its limits .... ") . !d.
20. Strader v. Graham, 5 1 U. S. 82, 93-94 (1850). Justice Taney stated t..ha t this sovereign
prerogative was lim ited ''in so far as the powers of the States in this respec t are restrained, or
duties and obli gations imposed upon them , by the Constituti on of the United States." ld. At 93. In
dealing with the smtus of Kenmcky slaves who had, by Ohio law attained freedom from their
sojourn in Ohio, however, he held that:
T here is nothing in the Consti tution of the United States that can in any degree contro l
the law of Kenmcky upon thi s subject. And the condition of the negroe s, therefore, as
to freedom or slavery, after their re turn, depended al together upon the laws of that
State, and could not be influenced by the laws of Ohio.

!d. At 93-94.
In the Kenmcky courts, Strader marked a limitation of the comity accorded to free states
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Equally, free states claimed autJ10rity to gra.nt liberty within their
borders to slaves who lawfully passed into their jurisdiction even temporarily.21 Lemmon v. People 22 is emblematic. The prevailing opinion
in Lemmon acknowledged that the guarantees of Article IV were designed to "constitute the citizens of the United States one people" and
to "secure a community of intercourse.'m The court nonetheless rejected the claim of a Virginia res ident th at she was entitled to retain
her servant m slavery while passing through abolit:: onist I'-Jew York.
A citizen of Virginia, havin g hls horne in that st1te and ::ev~r havi11g been
with in the State of New Yo rk. has the same rights unde• our la'NS which a
native born citi ze n domiciled elsewhe re would have , and no o th~rs .... The
position that a c itizen carries with him. into ~ve ry Sta te in to which he may
go, the legal institutions of the one in which he was bom c<mnot be s upport·
ed.''

in Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh) 467 (1820) 24 yea rs e;dier. The Kentucky Court, however, distinguished the seven years of r~sidence at issue in Rankin from the temporary visit at
issue in Strader. See Tom Davis, (of color), v. Tingle, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 539 (1848) (freedom
vested where slave lived in Ohio long enough to establish domicile).
The theme recurred in Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1856)
(holding that effect of Scan's Illinoi s residency was to be determined by the laws of Missouri and
giving effect to Missouri's refusal to recognize the freedom cor.ferred by Tilinois). Justice Nelson's
concurring opinion set forth at greater length t.'1e proposition that just as the free states could
exercise "complete and absolute powe r over" the status of individuals within u'leir boundaries to
free slaves, the "sovereign character of the States of L'le Union" gave Missouri authority to decide
whether or not to recognize the freedom granted by the laws of Mi ssouri when Dred Scon crossed
its borders. !d. at 458-67.
For other cases denying recognition to liberty granted by free states, see, e.g. , Mitchell v.
Weils, 37 Miss. 235 ( 1859) (re fusing to recognize New York manumissi on for estate administra·
tion purposes even LfJough former slave was New York residen t); Liza v. Pu issant, 7 La. Ann. 80,
8 1-83 (1852) ("It rests with eac h state to establ ish and regulate che domestic relations of its inhabitants. A state may pro hib it slavery wit..'1in its limits bu t this imposes no obligation on oL'ler state s
to hold the conditions of persons domiciled there as extin gui shed by reason of a presence in the
State to which the relation is not recogn ized.").
21. The earliest of the se cases, Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 ;viass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836),
held that by entering Massachusens, a Louisiana master and slave became "subject to all its mu·
nicipal laws" and hence "entitled [onl y] to the privileges wh ich those laws confer." The master
was, therefore, not entitled to assert dominion over the sl ave . See, e.g. , Jackson v. Bull och, 12
Conn. 38 (1837) (freeing slave of sojourning sluve-owner); Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 O hi o 623,
63 1 (1856) ("Kentucky can not, by L'1e law of comity, demand oi this state an abrogati on of its
constitution and municipal laws, to pro mme any of its own ;x:cu!iar institutions ... nor can Ohio
make any such demand of Kentucky.").
22. 20 N.Y . 562 (1860).
23. /d. at 607 (1860) .
24. !d. at 608-09. Cf id. at 598-99 (?.rgument by counsel that recogn.ition of foreign status is
limited by municipal law, and analogizing re fu sal to recognize incestuous or polygamous marriages lawful in a foreign domicile).
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Considerations of comir; might coun sel m favor of recognizing status
extraterritorially, but the fin al decision in cases of moral conflict rested
with the domestic polir;.
Like the comity accorded to free or slave status before the Civil
War, the black letter rule of extraterritorial marriage recognition, after
all, has an exception for marriages that are antithetical to strong local
policy ,25 and in cases of strong moral dissensus, the authority of local
polities has been vindicated in the past. 25
After the Civil War, the most dra.iuatic example of interstate moral
conflict spawned by the tragic history of American slavery suggests
again that doctrines of comity 'Nould not be sufficient to require an unwi lling state to recognize foreign same-sex. marriages. In the era before
Loving v. Virginia, some states which prohibited interracial marriages
recognized such marriages if contracted in a pennissive jurisdiction.
But another line of authority took advan tage of the standc.rd confl icts
doctrine to refuse such recognition either on the basis of explicit statutory direction, or the court's perception of public policy. 27 Indeed,

25. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) CON"rLICT OF LAWS§ 283 (2) and cmt. k (1 971) (stating that the validity of a marriage which is val id where celebrated can be defeated by "the strong
publi c policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage"); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 131.
26. The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act is testimony to one set o f effof'.s to preclude
domiciliaries from taking advantage of looser foreign laws; common law conflicts cases have
similarly vindicated local policy on occasion. See e.g ., Williams v. Oates , 27 N.C. 535 (1845)
(refusing to recognize extraterritorial marriage by state domiciliary contracted after divorce); State
v. Fenn, 47 Wash . 561 (1907) (refusing the same).
27. Cases refusing to accord recognition rested on two sets of arguments:
I ) Each state has sovereign power to refuse to ali ow activ ities contravening its public
policy wi thin its jurisdiction, and cohabitation in interracial marriages viol ates "public policy and
good moral s." See, e.g., State v. Be ll, 7 Tenn. 7, 8 (1872) (interracial marriage celebrated by out
of state domici!iaries who move into Tennessee); State v. Tuny, 4 1 F. 753 (S.D. Ga. 1890) (upholding Georgia fornication conviction of interrac ial couple married in District of Columbia);
Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gran) 858 (1878) (pol icy against "unnatural alliances"
between races was "one upon which social order, pu blic morality and the best interests of both
races depend"); In re Takahashi's Estate, 129 ? .2d 217, 220 (Mont. 1942) (stating the "rule of
comity does not require that a state shall sanction within its own borders that which is repugnant
to its own law."); Succession of Gabisso, 44 So. 438 , 441 (La. 1907) (Marriage contracted "in
contraventi on of public policy and good morals" in another state is an "absolute nullity."); see
Toler v. Oa.l.:wood Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425 ( 1939) (West Virginia marriage celebrated
under the assumption that previous husband was dead, valid in West Virginia, he ld void in Virginia , because of statutory mandate, dictum: same rule applies to interracial marriages); Jackson v.
Jackson, 82 Md. 17 , 30 (1896) (dictum) (interracial marriages prohibi ted by statute are " absolutely
void here" though "valid elsewhere").
2) The state of domicile has the power to preve nt evasion by its domiciliaries of its laws
regarding marriage val idity, see, e.g., Grecnhow v. James, 80 Va. 636 (1 885); State v. Kennedy ,
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Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving, the protagonists in Loving v. Virginia,28 were an interracial Virginia couple whose marriage in the District
of Columbia led to their prosecution upon their return home. They
were remitted to ti-Je Equal Protection Clause by the failure of interstate
comity.

In. FULL FA1TH AND CREDIT AND NATIONAL UNION
The general doctrines of comity, of course, do not function unaided, for the constitution obligates states to grant "full faith and credit" to
the public acts and judgments of the oL1er states in the Union. It was
precisely to provide the acts and judgments of the states of the new
republic with more recognition than the comity afforded to foreign
nations that Article IV was drafted. 29 The question, however, is whether "full faith and credit" adds binding power to the arguments for extraterritorial recognition of same sex marriages.
A. Status, Article IV and Choice of Law

As I noted earlier, the understanding of the founding generation
was that full faith and credit did not require extraterritorial recognition
of a personal law of status acquired in one state when a resident trav-

76 N.C. 232 (1877) (interracial marriage between North Carolina domiciliaries celebrated in SouL'J
Carolina held void, although a contemporaneous case recognized a marriage contracted among
South Carolina domiciliaries. "A law like this of course would be very idle if it could be avoided
by merely stepping over an imaginary line."); Dupre v. The Executor of Boulard, 10 La. Ann.
4 11, 412 (1855) (refusing to recognize extraterritorial interracial marriage for purposes of estate
administration in order to avoid "evasion of the Jaws"); Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30
Gratt.) 858, 866 (1878) (to recognize extraterritorial marriages would allow "both races" by "stepping across an imaginary line, to bid defiance to the law"); Stevens v. United Sates, 146 F.2d 120,
123 (lOth Cir. 1944) (Oklahoma domiciliaries "cannot elude" prohibition of interracial marriage
by marriage in Kansas); Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483, 485 (Okla. 1924) (holding that Oklahoma
residents could not evade prohibition of interracial marriage by extraterritorial celebration).
28. 388 U.S. I (1967). The Loving's predecessors in the Supreme Court, Han Say Nairn and
Ruby Nairn were Virginia residents who had been married in North Carolina in an effort to evade
Virginia's prohibition. See Nairn v. Nairn, 197 Va. 734 (1956).
29. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co. 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935) ("The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial
proceedings of others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation .... "); Cf 2 ~X
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL Convention of 1787 488 (rev. ed. 1937) ("Mr. Wilson
remarked, that if LlJe Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the provision would
amount to nothing more than what now takes place among all Independent Nations."). In Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988), Justice Scalia reads this comment to suggest that in
the absence of Congressional action, the Framers intended the Full Faith and Credit Clause to "be
interpreted against the background of' rules of international comity.
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elect to another. If it had, u'"le Fugitive Slave Clause's prohibition of
"discharge from service" by " law or regulation" would have been unnecessary. Indeed, where the slave-owners sought to invoke the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to protect the bonds established by slave states
against interference when a slave legitimately reached free soil, such
efforts were unsuccessful. 30
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Court regularly denied r~hat
t'1e Constitution permitted, much less requi red the extraterritorial effect
of state authmity. 31 Tne Full Faith and Credit Clause did not r~q u irc
other states to recognize extraterritorial effect as a matter of defe~-c:nce
to state sovereignty 32 and the 1-"'rivileges and Immunities Ciause did
not mandate it as a matter of individual right. The tone is captt:red by
the reaction of the Court to th-~ claim t.~at a corporate charter could
claim extraterritorial recognition as of right: " If ... the provision [s] of
the Constitution could be construed to secure to citizens of each State
in u1e other States the peculiar privileges conferred by their iaws, an
extra-territorial operation would [thus] be given to local legislation
utterly destmctive of the independence and the harmony of t..1e
States." 33 Given this construction of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, it is not surprising that the full faith and credit claims raised on
behalf of extraterritorial recognition of interracial marriages were similarly unsuccessful. 34 Loving v. Virginia, after all, was analyzed as an

30. See e.g., Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622, 631 (1856) ("Kentucky cannot, by the
law of comity, demand of !Pis state an abrogation of its constitution and municipal laws, to promote any of irs own peculiar i:1stitutions ... nor can Ohio make any such demand of Kentucky. ").
But cf id. at 675 (Bartley, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that full faith and credit requires recognition
of slave status in transit).
ln Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1 860) the only constitutional challenge wrich the
court felt worthy of reply was the claim that tl1e national unity established by the Privileges and
lmmuni ties Clause was impugned by New York's refusal of a right of transit. The parties had
engaged in a desultory discussion of t!1e obligation of full faith and credit, see e.g., id. at 590, but
none seemed to view the obl igation as a bar to New York ' s exerci se of its authority within its
own boundaries. Two judges, Denio, J., id. at 604, and Wright, J. id. at 623, observed that the
Fugitive Slave Clause was necessary on ly because in irs absence states would be entitled to grunt
freedom to slaves crossing their borders.
31. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff. 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
32. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
33. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 181 (1868), questioned on other grounds, Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S . 648 (1981).
34. E.g. Ex Parte Kinney, 14 F.Cas. 602 (E.D. Va. 1879); cf Toler v. Oabvood Smokeless
Coal Corp. , 173 Va. 425 (1939) (West Virginia marriage celebrated under the assumption that
previous husband was dead, valid in West Virginia, held void in Virginia, despite full faith and
credit claim, (dictum); same rule applies to interracial marriages).
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equal protection and substantive due process case , not a c1a1m to full
fa ith and credit for the Lovings' District of Colu m bia marriage.
l\liuch of this analysis is adrnittedly contained in old cases, a..YJd a
serie s of revoiutions in choice of law and constitutional analy sis have
occurred since those cases were dec ided. H owever, the core of the Supreme Court' s modem analy sis of iJlterstate conflicts law seems at least
as i11.hospi table to recognition of Hawaiian same sex marriages in the
face of legi slative hostility on the pait of the receiving state. The most
recent authoritative formul ation of the obligations of faith and credit
outside of the realm of j udicial decrees holds that the " modest restrictions" of Article IV require that in order to impose its own law a state
must "have a sign ificant contact or signific<U1t aggregation of contacts
such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."35 V/hatever else one might say about a state which refuses to
recognize a marriage celebrated extraterritorially by its d omic i liari~s. it
is hard to claim that the state lacks significant contacts with the couple
it is attempting to sunder, or that there is a..11y unfair surprise in the
attempt to assert jurisdiction. 36
B . Migratory Divorce and "Domicile"
What, then, of the possibility of looking to the more robust full
faith and credit granted to judgments of other states? 37 The prob lem of
recognition of judgments does not figure prominently in the legacy of
race relations, but in litigation over the moral dissensus surrounding

35. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. S hutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (q uoting Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302,3 12-13 (1 98 1) (plurality opini on)).
Shutts also cited LIJe Hague dissent for the proposition that the Full Fai th and Cred it Clause requirement of respect for the laws of other states is " subject to the forum' s own interest in furtherin g its public pol icy." !d. at 819.
Subsequentl y in Sun Oi l v. Woruna..'l, 486 U.S. 717 (198 8), justice Scalia advanced the more
controversial rule that a "subsisting trJdition" of confl ict mles was per se vali d under fu ll fai th
and credit analysis. !d. at 728 n.2.
36. Professor Koppleman suggests in his article Same Sex Marriag e and Public Policy: The
Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUTNNIPI AC L REV. I 05 (1996), that the courts of a state which is
nei!.he r the present or past domicile of same sex Hawaiia.:1 marital partners would violate constitutional choice of law constraints if it fai led to recogni ze the marital status of litigants before it.
This might be true if the forum 's connection with the litigants and transaction were so slight as to
render its choi..:e of its own hostile law arbitrary; and there may be symbolic effect to be gained
by strategically engineering such sui ts. But this approach offers relatively little short-tenn so lace
to couples who seek to import Hawaiian marriages to their ovm Ccmi cile, or even Hawaiian couples who seek to migrate after establishing Hawaiian domicile.
37 . See, e.g., Underwriters Nat'! Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident& Health
Ins . Guar. Assn. , 455 U.S. 691 (1982); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S . 287, 293 (1942);
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S . 230 (1908).
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divorce the issue of full faith and credit to judgments is central. The
most recent tum of the doctrine could provide a basis fo r recognition
of Hawaii' s same-sex marriages.
In the era following World War TI, the Supreme Court interpreted
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to obligate states to recognize at least
some extraterritorial changes in marital status antitlu:tical to their local
law. Thus, in Williams v. North Carolina ,38 the Court L::ld that full
fa ith and credit would preclude North Carolina ' s b lga:r:ry prosecu tion
fo r marital cohabitation after an ex parte div orce and f:::r~l3E1<•.ge l.ll
Nevada if the parties' t\vo month sojourn in Nevad<J. est<tbli.shed '· 'domi ci!e ."39 So, too , in Sherrer v. Sherrer,4D the Court required l\1s.ssaci:.usetts to recognize a contested Florida divorce of a resident of rihssachusetts who migrated to F1orida for a year and returned to Massachuserts tw o months after her divorce and remarri age, in the ~eeth o:f a
Massachusetts statute precluding recognition. Justice Frankfurter ' s
dissent complained th at the result permitted "the States with the la".est
divorce laws to impose their policies upon all other S tates ." 41 In response, while recognizing "the importance of a State' s power to determine the incidents of basic social relationships into which its
domiciliaries enter," the Court determined that:
L'1e full faith and credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the
Constitution by its framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of
independent sovereign states into a nation. If in its application, local pol icy
must at times be required to give way, such is part of u'1e price of our federal
sy s tem.'~

Thus, even a strongly held policy preference was not grounds for fai ling to grant full faith and credit to a litigated judgment.

38. 3i7 U.S. 287 (1942).
39. After a second trial , the Supreme Court upheld the prosecuti on because of a determinati on !hat Nevada domicile had not been established. See Williams v. Nort.'1 Carolin a, 325 U.S.
226 (1945).
40. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
4 1. !d. at 366. More colorfully, he worried that the opinion would "endow with canstitutional sanctity a Gresham's Law of domestic relations." !d. at 367.
42. !d. at 355. See Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948) (requiring Massachuse tts to recognize
Nevada divorce granted after four months of residence to husband who later returned to Massachusetts); see also Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951) (requiring Vermont to recognize Florida
divorce obtained by Virginia resident after sojourn in Florida); Johnson v.Muelberger, 340 U.S .
581 (1951) (requiring New York to recognize contested Florida divorce of New York resident, despite the fact that in collateral anack it was shown that the Florida ninety day residency requirement had not been met).

1996]

TERRITORIALITY AND MORAL DISSENSUS

175

An effort to use these cases as a wedge for recogmt10n of
Hawaii's same-sex marriages, however, faces substantial difficulties.
The migratory divorce cases began with the premise that " [e]ach state
as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in u'1e marital status of persons domiciled within its borders," 43 &'1d u'lat once reduced
to judgment, decrees exercising that power over domiciliaries are ""valid throughout the \m ion." 44 There are thus two initial technical problems 1;vith atternp~i·ng to apply these cases to the prospect of ~~migrato ry
same-sex Inan~iagf;s"-or indeed ) any evasionary rnarriage.
First, the power w determine marital sta tus in the migratory divorce cases is lirr:ited to domiciliaries; even the quickest of "quickie"
:Nevada d ivorces required a six week residency and a declaration of
dorr1iciliary intent. 45 For Pennsylvania residen ts seeking to import a
Hawaii marriage after a Hawaiian honeymoon there is 1ikely to be at
least substantial debate about the relevant " domicile." Parties to contested extraterritorial d ivorces and their priv ies have been held to be
bound to implausible findings about transient "domiciles," but many of
the legal effects sought by same-sex mar--ital partners-such as tax
status and social welfare benefits- will involve a hostile home state
which is hardly a pm"Tj to the marTiage. 46 Just as North Carolina successfully contested the jurisdiction of Nevada to divorce the subjects of
its bigamy prosecution in Williams v. North Carolina, 47 we can expect
hostile states to contest vigorously Hawaii's jurisdiction to establish the
marital status of domiciliaries who return to seek tax or social welfare
benefits from their original home state.
Second, the extraterritorial divorce cases take advantage of the
powerful full faith and credit extended to litigated final judgments, and

43. \Villiams '!. North Carolina, 317 U.S. at 298.
44. ld. at 301.
45. At one point, Ura.,'1 went even further, asserting jurisdiction to divorce couples where one
member "wished to bece>me" a Utah resident. See NELSON BLAKE, THE RoAD TO Reno 122
(1962); Richard J. Aaron, Mormon Divorce and the Statute of 1852: Questions for Divorce in the
1980's, 8 J.CONTEMP. L. 5, 23-26 (1982). Where neither of the parties was a Utah resident, however, the divorces were vulnerable to attack in other jurisdictions. See Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263
(1877) (viewing Utah divorce of non-resident as assault on the sovereignty of neighboring states);
State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29 (1878) (refusing to recognize Utah divorce of two Minnesota
residents); Hardy v. Smith, 136 Mass. 328 (1884) (refusing to recognize Utah divorce of two
Massachusetts residents).
46. Cf REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFL!Cf OF Laws, § 74 cmt. b (1971) (denying jurisdiction via third party estoppel "has no relevance to the question whether a state may prosecute
for bigarny, or for unlawful cohabitation, a person who has obtained a divorce in a state which
had no judicial jurisdiction to grant it").
47. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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it is far from clear that then issuance of marriage certificates ca.n be
regarded as a judgment. These obstacles could conceivably be overcome by sufficiently creative transient couples and a sufficient ly sympathetic Hawaii judiciary seeking to generate judgments binding on the
receiving state. 48 But a determined receiving state is not without gambits of its own. 49

48 . Assuming a coopcratjve Hawali judicial systr:.: m. 3.i1 r!xpcd!reJ decl aratory judgment actio n agair.st the partners' horne sta te seeki ng a declarati on of n;3.ritai :;t.·uus and Hawaiian domicile
could arguably serve the purpose . In an earlier era, Pro fc:: :~o r Eh ren~ wc ig suggested that deciaratory judgment~ entere d in more liberal states could establish the mJ..rital status of interracial couples
who sought to enter states with miscegenation prohibitions. Aleen A. Ehrenzweig, Miscegenation
in tr.e Cor.jlict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Reswtemem Second, 45 CORNELL L. Q. 659,
662 (1960).
Assuming the home state " does busi ness" in Hawaii sufficient to grant personal jurisdiction cf Nevada v. Hall, 44D U.S. 4 10 (1979), in t.he f3ce of a srrearn of Pennsyivania residents
seeking to establish Hawaii marriages, Pennsylvania would be faced with the prospect of either
f>J.ri_ng permanent local counse l to contest the issue of domi cile or acceding to Hawaii 's marital
judgments .
49. Opponents of same-sex marriage at the federal level, moreover, have not ignored the fact
that the majestic generality of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is followed by a delegation to
Congress of authority " by general Laws [to] prescribe the Manner in w hich such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art IV, § L The so-called
"Defense of Marriage Act" provides that no state shall "be required to give effect" to a foreign
law or judgment " respecting a re lationship between persons of the same-sex that is treated as a
marriage." Act of Sept 21, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat 2419) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
Professor Tribe is on record proposing that the enforcement clause "includes no congressional power to prescribe that some acts, records and proceedings that would otherwise be entitled
to full faith and credit under the Full Faith and Credit Clause as judicially interpreted shall instead
be entitled to no faith or credit at all." 142 CoNG. R.Ec . 55931-32 (da.ily cd. June 6, 1996) (letter
by Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward M. Kennedy).
Professor Tribe's position is in some tension with a line of dicta suggesting that the Supreme Coun would welcome and defer to Congressional action delineating the reach of the full
faith and credit obligation. See e.g ., Sun Oil Co. v. Woru-nan , 486 U.S. 717, 728 (198 8) (suggesting that Congress could designate particular issues as "substantive" for choice of law purposes);
Williams v. North Carol ina, 325 U.S. 226 , 266 (!945) (B:ack , J., dissen ting); Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343, 352 n.I S (1948) (alluding to Congress ional powe r to legislate); id. at 364 n.l3
(Frankfurter, d isse nting) (suggesting that Congress could alter full faith and credit accorded to
divorce decrees); Yarborough v . Yarborough , 290 U.S. 202, 2 15 n.2 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting)
(expanding or contracting clause at the direction of Congress); Robert H. Jackson , Full Faith and
Credi!-the Lawyer's Clause of the Consritution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. I, 21-24 (1945).
Some legislative history likewise points to a co-equal role for Congress in delineating the
reach of the full faith and credit obligation. Madison claimed (Federalist No. 42, at 387) that the
unadorned full faith and credit obligation inherited from the Articles of Confederation was "extremely indeterminate," and Congressional power to prescribe effect constitu ted an "evident and
valuable improvement ... ." THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (Jam es Madison). See 2 MAx FARRAND,
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 488-89 (rev. ed. 1937) ("Doer. Johnson
thought the amendment as worded would authorize the General Legislature to declare the effect of
the Legislative acts of one state , in anoL'Jer state."); Dougla> Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equ<J!
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Assuming for the moment that a receiving state is required to
recognize same-sex ma:Tiages as "marriages" when the couple enters its
borders, it can still seek to exercise its own sovereign authority over
vvh at follows from that status in two ways. First, just as the legal mechan ism of divi sible divorce-in which states treated some legal incidents
of marital dissolution as following from an ex parte extraterritorial divorce, while denying others- followed from migratory divorce,50 it is
not diffic ult to imagine a state which is obliged to recog nize same sex
n·; 3.1Tiages as "marriages" responding by dividi_ng th e perq uisi tes of
;n;;;;.-; iages and vesting the more appealing ones in heterosexual unicns.51

Second , a.t'ld more importantly, a hostile receiving state, even if
ini tially compelled to recognize an extraterritorial marriage , can invoke
its own authority over its new domiciliaries prospectively . A sufficiently i;1transigent receiving state could statutorily decree "divorce" for
s2.1ne sex couples who choose ultimately to come to reside in within its
borders. To be sure, legislative divorce is no longer the nonn, 52 but
the 19th century precedent upholding legislative divorce against due
process attack has been regularly cited as good ev idence of the authoritY of states over marri age within their boundari~s. 53

and Territorial States: The Constitutionnl Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249,
297 -98 (1992) (arguing that omission of language in prior draft that "operation shall be binding in
other states, in all cases to which it may relate, and which acts are within the cognizance and
jurisdic tion of the State ... " implied that the final clause "presupposed choice-of-law rules and
left detailed specifications of those rules to the courts or to Congress").
The bener attack, it seems to me, is a claim that the Defense of Marriage Act is not the
type of "general"' law contemplated by the constitutional text, perhaps bolstered by a reference to
the equ<!.l protection princ ipl es of Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) .
SO. See, e.g. , Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) (recognizing Nevada divorce as
tem1inating marriage but not obligation of support); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) (holding
that a Nev ada divorce binds the world as to bigamy and bastardy, but not support); Kreiger v.
Kre iger, 33 4 U.S. 555 (194S); Hudson v. Hudson, 53 Cal. 2d 735 (extraterritorial divorce did not
affec l ob li gation of support).
51. Cf State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 ( 1872) (prohibiting cohabitation of interracial couple lawfully married out of state).
Such reservations of perqui sites for heterosexual unions would, of course , be subject to
chal lenge under the equal protection clause. But if Romer v. Evans does not prohibit states from
refusi ng to perform same-sex marriages generally , it is not clear why it should prohibit imposing
second class status on such marriages as L1e state is compelled to recognize.
52. Indeed, it is prohibited by a number of state constitutions. See NELSON BLAKE, THE
ROAD TO RENO 56 (1962) (reporting that by 1867, at least 33 state constitutions specifically prohi bi ted legislative divorce).
53. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (approving Oregon legi slative divorce without
notice to wife where husband had immigrated to Oregon, wife had remained in Ohio); Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 296 ( 1942) (citing Maynnrd). While the Oregon legislature acted at
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If there is a constitutional obstacle to these responses, it does not
flow from the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the structure of the Union. Depending on where the Court ultimately comes to rest on the
equal protection rights of gays and lesbians, such gambits might be
subject to challenge under the rather murky principles of Romer v. Evans. But such attacks put the rabbit into the hat. If a refusal to recognize fully or an effort to dissolve sa.'!le-sex marriages celebrated in
other states is an invidious denial of equal protection, it is hard to see
why the initial decision to deny access to matrimony domestically is
not equally invidious. In any event, such attacks are addressed at greater length by others. I want to explore another line of analysis which
could facilitate recognition of some same sex couples as families even
if the federal courts do not establish discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation as constitutionally invidious.

IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL
A. The Rights of Travel and Migration
The United States was established with a heritage of free interstate
travel and migration. The Articles of Confederation provided protection
for "free ingress and regress to and from any other state." 54 Although
the explicit textual protection did not survive in haec verba in the Constitution, from early in the country's history, courts have recognized the
right to travel among the states of the union as one of the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship under Article IV, and the facility

the request of the husband in Maynard, the divorce was imposed against the will of the wife, and
there was no suggestion in the opinion that an involuntary annulment would not have been equally
within the legislative power.
Although Justi ce Curtis , di ssenti ng in Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 599 (1856) (Curtis, J.,
dissenting), had suggested that abrogation of a marriage upon immigration would violate the constitutional prohibition on impairments of contracts, the Court specifically rejected the claim that
marital unions can invoke conrract clause protection. Maynard, 125 U.S. 287 (1 888); Hunt v.
Hunt, 131 U.S. App. clxv (1 879). See also Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
517, 628 (1819) (Conrract clause "never has been unders tood to restrict the general right of the
le gislature to legislate upon the subject of divorces.").
54. Article rv of the Articles of Confederation provided:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friend ship and intercourse among the people
of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall
have free ingress and regress to and from any other State ... .
!d.
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of interstate migration has become a staple of our natio;:al identity .55
Indeed, it was precisely the proposition that African Americans recognized as citizens ifl a free state would have the right to reb.i.n that status when traveling in slave states that impelled Ju stice Ta_ney i.n Dred
Scott v. Sandford to reject so forcefully the possibility of citizenship for
the descendants c.f slaves. 56
The revers<2l of Dred Scott by L'1e birthright citizenship and the

Privileges and In;__rnunities Clauses of the Fourteenth

.r\.rr~ ~:nd rnent

anteed that A..fric:m 1\mericans, like other citizens, wert

guar-

c ~)r;sti ·~utt o n ally

entitled to travel arf!ong the states. The citizenship clcu2:~=:: Gf the Fourteent.il Amendment -.;vas intended to overrule Dred 3cut:, 57 and overtum u'1e regime under which states exclu ded free blacks a.nd abolitionists.58 By granting birthright citizenshi p in the nation &J1d residencybased citizenship in the states, the Framers of t'le Fourteenth A.mendment insured that the right to travel between states could no longer be
denied to blacks or other disfavored residents because they were not
"citizens." 59 By prohibiting state abridgment of the privileges and im- - - - - - - - - - -- ·- - - - - - - - - - - - -·-····- - - --- - - 55. In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), Justice
Washington had identified LI-te "right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in other
state, for purposes of trade, agricu lture, professional pursuits, or otherwise ... '" as one of the
privileges and immunities protected by Article IV of the Constitution. See United States v.
Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 297-98 ("Undoubtedly the right of citizens of the Scates to reside peacefully in. and to have free ingress into and egress from the several states [against both their own
and other states] ... .'"fused into one by Article IV Section 2); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) ("the clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a
citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union for L'le purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation .. .. "); Paul v. Virginia. 75 U.S. (8 Wal l.)
168, 180 (1869) (Privileges and immunities clause "gives . .. [citizens of each sute] the right of
free ingress into other States, a:1d egress from them.").
56. Dred Scou. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416-417,23 (citizenship "would give .. . [them] the
right to enter every other State whenever Ll-tey pleased .... ").
57. See , e.g., Sugarman v . Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenti!lg).
58. See, e.g .. CP.ESTER J. ANTIEAU, THE ORJG!NAL UNDERSTANDING Of THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 33 (1981). Stating that:
The denial of the opportunity to move freely throughout the land was one of il>e badges of serv itude imposed on the slave ... and, in ratifying the Fourteenth .O..mend.:nent
the people intended that the privileges and immunities clause of that Amendment
would protect Blacks, as well as Whites, in their freedom to move and travel around
the country. without restriction by LIJe States and their political subdivisions.
See also, e.g., PAUL FlNKLEMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 342-43 (1981). S\ating that
In making the freedmen citi zens of the states in which they resi ded, the amendment .. . required that the individual states recognize the rights of citizenship and
therefore grant comity to blacks entering from other states. No longer could a southern
state imprison a free black sai lor from the North or indeed, prohibit free blacks from
entering their domain.
59. It was clear to all concerned LIJat LIJe status of citizenship would entail a right to inter-
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munities of citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment provided an explicit
fe deral protection for interstate travel and migration.
Thus, u'1e Court was on solid historical ground in the Slaughterf{ouse Cases6D when it announced that the right to interstate travel
was a " privilege a11d immunity" of national citi zenship protected by the
Fou rteenth Amendment. 6 1 The Court further recognized that the Fourteenth A m endment established the national privilege th at "a citizen of
th e United States can , by his own volition , become a c itizen of any
Stz. te of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, w ith the: same
eights .1s oth :~~l· citizens of that state."62
Since tbe Slaughter-House Cases, the Court has viewed the righr
to rn igrate as an essential pm1 of the federal structure .63 ,t..,s Ju stice

statr::

tra v~ l

&id migration . In response to

t.~c

amendment introducing L1e citizenship provi si ons of

the Fourtl!enth Amendment on the floor of the Senate on May 30, 1866, Sena tor Cowan of Pennsylv ani8. observed:
[a] s I underst;md the rights of the States under the constitution at present, California
has the rig ht, if she deems it proper, to forbid the entrance into her territory of any
person she chooses who is not a citizen of some one of the United States . She cannot
fo rbid [a citizen 's] entrance ....

CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong ., 1st Sess 2891 (1866).
Cou;an argued against the amendment because he was "unwilling, on the part of my State to give
up the right . .. of expelling ... " Gypsies. /d.
A similar understanding was articulated in debate on the citizenship provisio ns of the 1866
C ivil Rights Bill. See e .g. id at 1757 (Sen. Trumbull) ("Inherent, fundamental rights which belong
to free citizens" include the right "to go into any Sate of the Union and to reside there and the
United Sates Government will protected him in that right").
60. 33 U.S . (1 6 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873)
61. !d.
62 . l d. at 80. See also id. at 112-13 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("A citizen of the United States
has a perfect constitutional right to go and reside in any State he chooses . .. and a11 equality of
rig hts wirJ1 every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him ir1 that
l-i ght.") .

63. Se~ Zobel •;. Williams , 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan , J., concurring) ("unquestioned
hi st0ric recogni tion of the principle of free interstate migration" finds " its unmistakable e sse n c~ in
Lhat document that transformed a loose confederation of states into one Nation."); Dunn v.
Biu msie in , 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (right to travel is "fundamental personal right"); Griffin v.
Breckenridge, ,103 U.S. 88, 106 (1971) ("right to pass freely from State to State" protected by
Constitution, alth•)ugh it does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Am endment); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 6 18, 629 (1 969) ("This Court long ago recogni zed that the nature of our
Federal Union and our constituti ona l 'concepts ' of personal liberty unite to require !.hat all citizens
be fr~e to ·travel throughout the length and breadth of our land .... "); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S . 745, 758 (1966) ("a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be [a] necesSill)' concom iL'l.'ll of a stronger union ... ."); !d. at 767 (opinion of Harlan, j_) (" [T]he right to
unimpeded interstate travel, regarded as privilege and immunity of national citizenship, was hiswrica!ly seen as a me thod of breaJr...ing down state provincialism, and facilitatin g the creation of a
true federal union ."); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S . 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concmnng)
("The ri ght to move freely fro m State to State is an incident of national ci tizenship .... "); !d. at
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O'Connor commented:
It is difficult to imagine a 1ight more essential to the Nation as a whole than
the ri ght to establish residence in a new Stare. Just as our federal system
permits the States to experimem w ith different sc-cial and economic programs . .. it allows the ind ividual to sertie in the State offering those prog;-<:tms best tailored to his or her tastes.""'

As mernbers of this federal system, states are not entitled to discrimins.te again st or deny nevv corfiers pobtlcal or econornic benefits on the
basis of the exercise of their constitutional ri ght to migrate from a.'lother state, or to penalize them for exercising th at right. 65
-v\ ith this background , at least for gay couples who have been
marrie.::I as Hawaii domicilia,--ies, are there: constituti onal objections to a
system by wh ich states other than Hawaii exact a forfe iture of marital
status a.s the price of migration? Ju stice Black in Wi!liam.s v. North
Carolina maintained that a rule allowing North Carolina to refuse to
recognize a Nevada divorce in a domestic prosecution for bigamy was
effectively a prosecution for exerc ising "their constitutional right to
pass from a state in which they were validly married into another state
which refuses to recognize their marriage. Such a consequence runs
counter to the basic guarantees of our federal union.' 166 And in the era
before the Civil War, slaves freed in Northern states invoked the right
to interstate travel as protection against u'1e imposition of Southern laws

185 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Rich o r penniless, Duncan's citizenship under the Constitution
p ledges his strength to the defense of California as a part of the United States and his right to
migrate to any part of the land he mus t defend is something she must respect under the same
ins011ment"); W ill iams v. Fears, !79 U.S. 270, 274 (19CO) ("Undoubtedly the right . .. ordinarily,
0f free transit from or through the territory of any State is ~ rig ht secured by the Founeenth
Ame ndment . .. "); Twining v. New Jersey , 211 U.S . 78, 97 ( 1908) ("right to pass freely from
state to state" is a privilege of national citizenship); Pz.ul v. V irginia, 75 U.S. !68, 180 (1869)
(Article r-1 gives citizens of each state "the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from
them") quoted with approval in Hickli n v. Orbed:, 437 U.S . 518, 524 (1978) ; Baldwin v. Montana
Fish aiJd Game Comm' n, 436 U.S. 37i , 380 ( 1973); United States v. 'Nheeler, 254 U.S. 281,295
(1 920); T ravis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78 ( 1920); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S .
239 , 250 ( i 898)).
64. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 76-77 (O'Connor, i ., concurring).
65 . See Anorney General of New York v. Soto LDpez, 476 U.S . 898 (1986) (civil service
preference); Hooper v. Bernalillo Co unty Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1 985) (tax advantages); Zobel
v. Williams , 457 U.S. 55 (1 982) (payments from state oil royalties); Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County , 4 15 U.S. 250 (1974) (medica! benefits); Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U.S. 330
( 1971) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare benefits).
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), pennined Iowa to defer the opportunity to obtain a
divorce for one year after ta.IGng up res idency , though not to deny it entirely.
66 . Wi diam s v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,265 ( 1945) (Black, J. , di ssenting).
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when they ventured south, even as slave-owners in voked the right to
interstate travel to protect L~e ir dominion over their sl aves, established
by the laws of their home states, against L'1terference from the laws of
the states which the y visited.
Justice Black ' s claim , however, was voiced in dissent, and t.\)e
often-rejected claims of t,i-)e slave-owners and freedmen never extend ed
beyond claim for a right of pass;::.ge through hostile territory .67 In the
general case I arn afraid a fe deral sy sterr1 w hich vests domesti c re lations power in the states me;m s precisely that m igrants sacrifice legai
advantages in their state of origin when they seek to exercise their
rights to travel or migrate.
The price of obtaining the ht~n efils of a new sta te citi zenship is
leaving behind the benefits of che old. Even fo r visitors from othe r
states, the Privileges and Immunities C lause of Article IV has long
been interpreted only "to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures
into State B the same priviieges which the citizens of State B enjoy."68 "Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own States are
not secured in other States . . . .'.n9 In more recent cases involving
interstate migration, discriminatory denial of econom ic or political
entitlements to newcomers where the same rights were granted to long
time residents formed the gravamen of t.1e complaints. But if
Pennsylvania's long-term resident cannot o btain the benefits of samesex marriage, there is no apparent discrimin ation against 3.1"1 immigrant
from Hawaii who is subject to the same rule.
B . The Right to Travel and Family Values
The analysis tlms far treats the issue as a denial of legal
entitlements as to which individuals migrating from Haw aii and Pennsylvania residents are similarly situated. The fact, however, is that an
exercise of Pennsylvania' s auth ority to deny recogn ition to marriages of
unconventional immigr3.1>ts as they cros s its boundary involves more
than a refusal to recognize an abstract leg al capacity . For Hawaiiar:t
emigrants, the denial of marital recognition mear!s rending a family
bond which has already been established . If courts recognize u'1at the
question is whether there is a righ t to migrate as an e xisting family, the

67. The only case which came close to establishing a ri ght to permanently migrate was Justice Taney 's opinion in Dred Scolt, which is hardly a congenial precedent.
68. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S . 385 , 395 (1 948) (c iti ng Paul, 75 U.S. at 180-81; Travis,
252 U.S. at 78). Al so quoied in Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988).
69. Paul v. Virgini a 75 U.S . 168, 180-8 1 ( !868) .
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analysis dons a different aspect. We might call this the " fam ily values"
approach.
To put the strongest case, assume a same-sex couple who have
raised children in Hawaii moves to Pennsylvania, and the biological
parent dies. Would Pennsy lvania be entitled to treat the children as
w ards of the state and L~e surviving spouse as a stra.'1ger to the children
she has raised as a lawful parent in. Hawaii? There is certa iniy precedent suggesting that a refusal to recognize a family unit in such circumstar:ces raises constituti onal doubts . T t1e destruction of a longstanding family uni t is an ev il that demands justification. The i:npc.si tion of th at evil as a consequence of migration is in tension with oo th
L~e mobility of national ci tizenship conferred by the Fourteenth
Amendment and the federal structure, as well as the proposition that a
state may not penalize the exercise of those rights.
It is reasonabl y clear that tt'le effort to dismember an ex isting
family initially recognized by domestic law would require justifications
more substantial than a mere policy preference for alternative living arrangements by the state. 70 This constitutional protection is not iimited
to families whose existence is initially sanctioned by law. In Stanley v.
Illinois/ 1 the children of Joan and Peter Stanley, an unmarried couple
who raised their children jointly for 18 years, were determined to be
wards of the state upon the death of their mother. Tne state claimed

70. Se e M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555. 564-65 (1 996) ("Choices about marriage. family
life, and the upbringing of cruldren are ... sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the
State' s unwarranted usurpation, di sregard or disrespect"; interest in retaining exis ting parent-cruld
relati onship is "commanding, indeed. far more precious than any property right.'") . Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring clear and convincing evidence for termination of parental
rights). Cf Smith v. Org of Foster Farn iiie s, 43 1 U.S . 816,862-63 (1977) (S tewart, J., concurring)
("If the St:!te were to a ttempt to fo rce the breakup of a natural fam ily, over the objecti ons of the
paren ts and their children. without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so
was thought to be in the children ' s best interest, I should have lirJ e doubt the State wo uld have
intruded impem1issi bly .... ") quoted with approva l in Qu illoin v. Wolcon. 434 U.S. 246 , 255
(1978). Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 253 (1 983) ("[T)he relationship of love and duty in 3.
recogn ized family unit is an interest in li berty entitled to constitutional protection.").
ln some states, state constitutional guarantees provide additional protection. See, e.g ..
Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W. 2d 682 (Tenn. 1995) (statutory anempt to im pose grandparent
visitati o n on adoptive famil y violates state constitution' s right to fami ly autonomy); Brooks v.
Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995) cerr. den ied 116 S.Ct. 377 (1995) (statutory gra.'ldparents
visitation statu te invalid under state constitution as applied to families where there is no threat of
harm to the ch ild); Beag le v. Beagl e, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Beagle v. Be agle, 654
So.2d 1260, 1263 (1 995) (Florida's constirutional protection of privacy inv al idated statutory efforL~
impose grandparent vis itation over parental objections whether the child "lives in a loving, nurntring home wiL'l both parents, a lovin g home headed by a workillg mother whose erstwhile husband
deserted the fami iy or with a loving faL'ler devastated by a divorce not of his asking.").
7!. 405 U.S . 645 (1972).
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that by defining the unmarried father-Peter, an Illinois resident-not
to be a "parent," it could ignore the existing relationship between father
and chi ldren.. TI1e Court, however, declared " the interest of a man in
the children he has sired and raised undeniably warrants deference, and
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Justice 'v'lhite
acknowledged that "famiiy relationships unlegitimized by a marriage
ceremony . .. [invoive fam ily] bonds ... as warm, enduring, and
important as those arising '>V ithin a more fom1ally organized f<:cmily
unit.'m
i\llr. Sta11!ey was entit led to invoke constitutional protection for his
family on the basis of both his on-going care taldng relationship and
biological bonds. Subsequen t cases hold that biology is not sufficient to
es tablish constitu tion al protection for the parent-child relationship, but
that the crucial element is fu li commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood. 73 A father whose connections with his biological child are
not solemnized by marriage, but who nonet.1-jeless "grasps the opportunity" to develop a relationship with his children, and "accepts . ..
responsibility for the child' s future," is entitled to "enjoy the blessings
of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development." 74 One whose relationship remains
merely "potential," rather tJ1an "developed" can claim no constitutional
protection.75
Certainly, in the case of same sex couples who have married a..-1d
established families with children in Hawaii, the parent-child relationships are as "wann, enduring and important" as those within a "developed" non-marital fam ily of different sexes. Indeed, L~e same sex parents have sought legal recogn ition for the relationship by seeking the
" protection . . . provided by the laws that authorize fo rmal marriage."76 Under existing iaw, a state that sought to ignore a biological
par ent-child relationship because of hostility to the law under which

72. ld. at 651-2.
73. See e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 445-46 (1990) (opinion of St,evens, J.,
citing cases).
74. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); see also Quilloin v. W alcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978) (denial of unmarried bi ological father ' s right to veto adoption did not violate constitution,
where father had made no effort to establi sh rel ationship with children); Caban v. Mohammed,
~Ai U.S. 380 (197 9) (denial of unmarried biological father's right to veto adoption violated equal
protection; father had establ ished relationship with children); id. at 397 (Stewart, J. dissenting)
(constitutional protection requires "enduring relationships"); id. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(developed relationship could warrant constitutional protection).
75 . !d.
76. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263 .
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marriage was solemllized would be on dubious constitutional ground.
The question is whether, in the absence of biological corL'1ections, the
prior legal recognition of tJ1e fami ly unit in a11other state, combined
with an on-going care taking relationship is sufficient \:o invoke constitutional protection.
One building block is Smith v. Organization of Foster Fam ilies for
Equaiity and Reform,"17 where the Court "assumed;, L'1at foster parents---who had no biological connection with the children en!:rusted to
L~eh· ccie--cou1d invoke a protected liberty interest in the ongoiilg
re1at ionsh1p~ Justice Brennan con1Jnented that:
[T]he importance of the fam ilial relationship, to u'-:e indi,;idua!s invoivc:d ar1d
steins frorn the emotional attachrnt:nts Lil1t derive frorn the
intimacy of dail y association, and from the role it plays in 'p~om ot[ing] a
way of life' through the instruction of children . . . At least where a child has
been placed in foster care as an infant ... and has remained continuously for
several years in L'le care of the same fos ter parents, it is natural that the fos ter family should hold the same place in the emotional life of the foster
child, and fulfill the same social izing functions, as a natural family."
t·J the society,

By this measure, an existing legally recognized fami ly wiu'1 same-sex
parents clearly partakes of the family values that invoke constitutional
protection when they migrate to a new state.
Likevvise, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 19 Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion upheld California's decision to prefer legally sanctioned relationships to biological ties. California's domestic relations law excluded
a biological father from parental rights where the mother sought to
invoke the presumption of paternity aris ing out of her on-going legal
mmTiage with anoti1er man. Justice Scalia read prior federal precedent
to accord cons titutional protection to "relationships that develop within

T /. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) .
18. id. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4D6 U.S. 205, 231-33(1972)). See also Smith ,
4.J l U .S. at 846:
It is one t>'ling to say that individuals may acquire a libert"f interes< against arbitrary
govemment?.J interference in the family-like associations i.;1!0 which they have free ly
c11tered, even in the absence of biological connection or state-law recognition of the
rebtionship. It is qu.ite another to say that one may acquire such an interest in the face
of ~110ther's constitutionally recognized li berty interest that derives from bloc.d relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human right.

In the case of a same-:;ex relationship of the son we are discussing, of course, t..'1ere is no competi.ng d2im on the part of a biological parent, and the fam.i ly can invoke tbc sanction of another
~tate S
1

law.

79. 49 !

u.s.

110 (1989) .
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the unitary family," 80 typified by a "marital family ." 81 He relied on a
tradition of protecting "the marital family" 82 against the claims of outsiders, the "aversion to declaring children illeg itimate," 83 combined
with the importance of protecting a "extant mmital family" to uphold
California's decision to exclude the biological father fro m parental
rights. 34 Despite its impact on the interests of the biological father a.'ld
his child, California was free to preserve t.~e " integrity of tt'le traditiona! fami ly unit." 85
Again, if the Court recognizes the imoonr.u1ce of protecting a
legall y constructed "marital" family against th,;; disru ptior. by a b.iological, but non-marital parent, it should recognize: the magnitude of the
loss imposed where a same sex "m;u-ital family'' fmTnally established in
Hawaii is subjected to the penalty of dissolution upon migration.
In the case of a Hawaiian emigrant fami ly with children, moreover, the argument for recognition is strengthened by the interests of
children who will lose the legal relationship to one of the only two
parents they have ever known because of t.l-J.e receiving state's refusal to
recognize the existence of ai1 existing marital fami ly. A child who is
deprived of legal recognition of one of two parents suffers significant
deprivation. 86 Where one parent dies or a current marital relationship
dissolves the effects of non-recognition could be traumatic.
W hile the parents themselves could avoid the threat of a Pennsylvania dissolution by remaining in Hawaii, the children involved have
no such choice. To deprive them of existing family ties because of

80. ld. at 123.
81. ld. at n.3.
82. ld. at 124.
83. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125.
84. id. at 129.
85. id. at 130. At least one New York court has applied similar reasoning against a biological father who, as a sperm donor, had previously waived parental right> , and now sought to establish his paterr>jty with respect to a child who had been raised in a family by a lesbian couple. See
In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377, 382 (Farn.Ct. 1993) (observing that the child
viewed the biological father as an "outsider attacking her family") rev 'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App.
Div. 1994) stay granted, 85 N.Y.2d 925 (1995).
86. See, e.g., In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 858 (D.C. App . 1995) (interest of
child of same sex union in "formaliz[ed] parental relationship"); In re Jacob. 86. N.Y.2d 651, 658
(1995) (interest of child of same-sex union in access to social security and life insurance benefits,
health insurance, inheritance, obligation for economic support. parental ability to make medical
decisions as well as benefits of permanency of parental figures); In re Adoption of Tammy, 416
Mass. 205, 214 (1993) (interest of child of same sex couples in opporturjty to inherit, access to
health insurance benefits, and "preservation] of unique filial ties"); In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B.
aiJd E.L.V.B, 160 Vt. 368, 376 (1993) ("financial support and emotional well-being" of child from
recognition of parental relationship in same-sex parmership).
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tl-)eir parents' decision to migrate is at odds with the constitutional
stricture agai..nst imposing burdens on chiidren because of their parents
actions. Tnus, the Court has regularly invalidated "classifications that
burden illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit relations of the ir parents, because 'visiting this condemnation on the head
of an infant is illogical and unju st. " ' 87 Li.!,;:ewise, the court in Plyler v.
Doe 88 was unwilling to sanction the ex dnsion of L~e children of illegal imm igrants fro m public schools; while "[their] parents have the
ability to copJorm their conduct to societal non-n s, and presu mably u'1e
ability to remove themseives from th e S tate's jurisdiction, the chi l·
dren . .. can affect neither u"1eir parents' conduct nor their own stctus."89 Like non-marital ch ildren, children of same-sex couples face
potential social difficulties even in L~e absence of state discrimination
triggered by their parents actions. Li.lce u~e children of illegal immigrants , they stand liable to be deprived of parental relationships not
because of what they have done, but because of who their parents are;
indeed what their parents have done was entirely legal in their previous
state of residence.
Tnis foc us on " family values" is more tha.'1 an exercise in hypothetical construction. While relatively few same-sex couples from Hawaii are likely to emigrate with their children to the mainland in the
next fe w ye ars, other jurisdictions have begun to recognize same-sex
couples as parents without Hawaii's constitutional fanfare. 90 For t.l-Je
more numerous families that h<~ve established their households in these
states in contemplation of continued legal relationships, the disruptive
potential of exclusionary legislation is equ ally severe. Where one
state' s laws establish family units involving sarne-sex couples precisely
in order to prov ide both tangibl e a..'1d psychic benefits to children of
stable fam ilies ,9 1 to deprive children of those benefits because of their

87 . Clark v. kter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (quoting Weber v. Aema Cas. & Sur. Co. 41}6
U.S . 164, 175 (1972)).
88. 457 U.S . 202 (19 82).
89 . !d. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
90. For states establishing fam ily units by adoption, see In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d
837 (D.C. App. 1995); In re Jacob, 86 N. Y.2d 651 (1995); In reAdoption of Tammy, 416 Mass .
205 (1993); In re Adopti ons of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368 (1993); In rePetition of K.M.
and D.M. to Adopt Oli via M., 274 Til. App.3d 189 (1995); In re Adoption of a Child by J.lV!.G.
267 N.J. Super. 622 (1993); In reAdoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 285 N.J. Super. l (1995).
For states recognizing visitati on rights in dissolved same sex family units , see Holtzman v.
Knorr (!n re Custody of H.S.H.-K.) , 193 Wis.2d 649 (1995); A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 58 1 (1992);
J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 13 14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
91. See, e.g .. In re M.M.D. & B.H.M. , 662 A.2d 837, 857 (D.C. App. 1995) (allowing adop-
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parents' deci sion to migrate to a new state raises constitutional objections of the first order.
I realize, of course, that t.~~is is hardly an airtight legal argument.
On one front, it is clear that the Court has thus far invoked the value of
the "marital fami ly" as a method of justifying government decisions,
rather than a basis for challenging r...1em. Justice Scalia has cautioned,
for a pluraiity, against "tum[ing] around" the approval in iY.tichael H . of
" favored treatment" of traditional fa.'Ttily relationships into " a constitutional requirement that [a] State [must] recognize (the primacy of
those relationships] ."92 Establishing the prernise t1at a legally recognized non-biological family that h3s deve loped intima~c emotional linkages has a constitutional interest in remaini ng intact requires extrapolation from current doctrine.
On a second front, the recognition of a constitutional interest does
not mean that interest w ili prevail. States are, in appropriately severe
cases, entitled to dismember even traditional families in the interests of
protecting chi ldren. The fam ily values argument puts directly at issue
the factu al premise that it is a grave deprivation to sunder childrens'
relationship with their non-biological parent in a same-sex marriage.
The premise is not likely to go unchallenged, for there are certainly
states that will maintain that gays and lesbians are per se unfit parents.
This, indeed, is the primary argument advanced in the most recent
round of litigation in Hawaii on behalf of the state's supposed "compelling interest" in denying recognition to same sex marital unions. 93
But this challenge is, it seems to me, an opportunity. Unlike the
appropriate definition of "marriage," the issue of what hurts children
can be joined on a basis which both is susceptible to concrete proof
and allows advocates to dramatize the human costs of non-recognition.
I am not sure what proof v,;onld disabuse a judge of an :intuition Ll-J.at
" marriage" is by definition the union of a man and a wom an; 1t 1s quite
clear, however, how to present e·1idence that childrer1 are in pain.~>'·

tion by second parent " formali ze[s ] a pa;ental relationship that [the child) r·~cognizes in fac t";
" (assures] ongoing responsibility" "assure[s] legal access and support" in the event of separation,
al lows access to health insurance by child) .
92. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 26 1, 286 (1990). Cf Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292 (1993) (refu sing to recognize right of potentiall y deportable minors to release into custody of "responsible adults" other than parents or guardians).
93. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *3 (Ha'"'· Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996) (state claims interest in promoting "optimal deve lopment of children is inconsistent with
same-sex marriage); see id. at * 18 (holding state has failed to establish any adverse effect on
children).
94. In the era of miscegenation statutes, judges professing deep hostili ty to interracial cohab-
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The ~ xtant studies suggest t.l-}at the state will have a hord case to
ma.l(e, 95 and it will rapidly become clear the extent to which animos ir-y
toward gays and lesbians is at work.
Tne argument from family values has L~e virtue of focusing atten ·
tion on the real human costs associated with a denial of recognition to
extraterritorial same sex marriages. If there is something wrong •;vith
these denials., it is not primarily an affront to I-Iawaii' s sovereign interests. It is the practical cnJ.elty of disrnemberi11g a farnil y that has bet~:..-;
legally joined, and the denial of equal respect in refus ing to acks10"~' l--
;;dge 1 legally sanctioned relationship on the basis of invidio us animu:;.
Relatively rarely carl constitutional i11tervention establish loving rdc.
tionships, but the argument from fam ily values at least provides the
hope of focusing on the reasons to prevent the states from extinguish
ing loving families which already exist.

i;;;cion were or.en a nrac<.ed to the comparable claim that L!-Je interest o f the childr en in the ir legitimacy '"nder ~n existing marriage was of greater import than the a ffront to loc ~.i morals. See Stat,;
v. Ross . 76 N.C. 224 (1877) (importance of allowing children of marriage to migrate 3r.d b-e considered legitimate); Greenhaw v. James, 80 Va. 636 (1885) (Richardson, j,, di sse nting) (refusal to
?.ccord re-::ognition would v isit the sins of the parent upon the "unoffe nding c hild"); cf Medway v.
Need har.:, l6 M ass. 157, 159-60 (1819) (focusing on " great inconvenience and cruelty of bastardizing the issue of such marri ages").
95. For recent overviews, see, e.g., Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Child ren by
Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW &
POLI CY 191 (1995); Marc E lovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-Use of
Social Science Research, 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POUC Y 207 (1995); Dav id K.
Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS . J. 345 (1994); Patric ia Falk, The Gap Between Psychosocial Assumptions and Emp irical
Research in Lesbian iHother Child Custody Cases in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CHILDREN 'S DEVELOPMENT 131 (Adele E. Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried, eds., 1994); Robert L.
Barret & Bryan E. Robi nson, Gay Dads, in REDEF!NlNG FAMILIES: L\IPLlCATIONS FOR CHJLDREN'S
DEVELOPMENT 157 (Adele E. Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried, eds., 1994); See Baehr v. Miike,
No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct Dec. 3, 1996) (holding t.IJat evidence
established no link b-etween same-sex parents and adverse effects on children).

